Experimenter

JUN 2014

Experimenter is a magazine created by EAA for people who build airplanes. We will report on amateur-built aircraft as well as ultralights and other light aircraft.

Issue link: http://experimenter.epubxp.com/i/323139

Contents of this Issue

Navigation

Page 38 of 39

EAA Experimenter 39 LATE LAST CENTURY I watched a fatal mishap at an air show. Not during some aerial derring-do designed to wow the crowd, but during a plain vanilla takeof . The airplane was an ultralight-like machine, one of dozens getting airborne for local fl ying. Airplane after airplane became airborne in little more than a few plane lengths—impressive and not at all unsafe. I heard the two-stroke engine power up and watched the little plane accel- erate down the grass strip. While the others became airborne within a few seconds of power-up, this plane kept rolling and rolling. With more than half the runway behind the plane, it rotated, climbed a few feet, then settled back onto the runway. I wish the story would have ended here, but the pilot contin- ued the takeof , fi nally getting airborne with not much runway left. This time the plane clawed a meager climb rate out of a hot, humid sky and cleared the trees at the end. Barely. I relaxed as the plane appeared to initiate a right turn to follow the course rules, but the right wing kept dropping. When it disappeared behind the trees, the plane was pointed nearly straight down. My entire conversation circle watched this tragic event. Our reactions ranged from instant analysis of what went wrong to the slow, sad shake of a deferentially lowered head. That was my fi rst reaction, but that sadness slowly morphed into anger. Why didn't the pilot abort the takeof ? There were plenty of opportunities. I assumed (always a dangerous thing but illustra- tive here) he was experienced in that airplane. If so, did he not notice the plane was not accelerating as briskly as it should have been? Absent that, he surely knew the takeof roll was tak- ing much more runway than it should have. Even if these two telltale signs were missed, the airplane refusing to climb out of ground ef ect and settling back to the grass must have been impossible to miss. Three lifesaving opportunities passed by. I don't know whether the pilot initiated that right turn or whether the airplane just rolled that way as it stalled. I would think the pilot would not attempt to maneuver the plane if it was barely making enough lift in level-winged flight. So, assuming again, if he tried to turn under those conditions rather than proceed straight ahead, well, "shoul- da, coulda, woulda." Mea culpa time: I have no right to judge this pilot. I wasn't in that cockpit. I wonder if some of my anger was really pro- jected fear that I might have done the same thing. I do have an obligation, however, to myself, family, friends, and others to learn from this tragedy. Replaying it in my head and discussing it with others turned my anger into a lesson learned 20 years ago. I haven't forgotten it yet. Coincidentally, a few days later, I forced a takeof abort at that same air show. I was in the right seat while another pilot was performing the takeof from the left seat. The scenario was freshly similar. The engine didn't achieve its maximum rpm when the throttle was advanced. I called that out to the fl ying pilot, but he was already aware of it and justifi ed it with some appeasement like "It'll come up with more speed." Well, it didn't, and I suggested we not continue the fl ight. His response, while continuing to watch the engine instru- ments, was "No, that doesn't seem right." But he continued the takeof roll. We had plenty of runway ahead, but the airplane was clearly not performing as it should. Although it appeared the plane would achieve takeof speed well before we ran out of runway, taking it airborne to resolve a power shortage issue was not in my playbook. I shouted at the other pilot to abort the takeof , and he did. The airplane didn't fl y for several days while repairs were performed on its faulty carburetors. Flight Test Decisions… …Or fl ight decisions test? BY ED KOL ANO FLIGHT TESTING TECHNIQUES E A A E X P _ J u n e 1 4 . i n d d 3 9 EAAEXP_June14.indd 39 6 / 3 / 1 4 8 : 4 2 A M 6/3/14 8:42 AM

Articles in this issue

Archives of this issue

view archives of Experimenter - JUN 2014